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Roadblocks to Remedy in Consumer
Fraud Litigation
Richard A. Givens*
LTHOUGH TREMENDOUS public attention is paid today to
substantive rules governing consumer transactions, present pro-
cedures often make effective action to remedy violations of these
rules extremely difficult. The resulting lack of enforcement injures
both consumers and competitors of those who are allowed to con-
tinue their violations.
Some possible methods of altering the rules which govern en-
forcement of private actions, such as the consumer class action, have
received extensive attention elsewhere.' It is therefore important
to focus on the barriers to effective governmental action and to as-
sertion of consumer defenses in collection suits.
I. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT ACTION
A. Criminal Enforcement
The public enforcement weapon which carries the greatest de-
terrent effect is criminal prosecution. State criminal laws, however,
are rarely used against consumer fraud, in part because of the com-
peting pressure of violent crimes on prosecutorial time and in part
because of the limited scope of state statutes, which in general de-
rive from larceny rather than fraud concepts.' Consequently, the
* The author: Richard A. Givens (B.A., LL.B., Columbia University; M.A., Uni-
versity of Wisconsin) is Regional Director of the New York Office of the Federal Trade
Commission. Previously he was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of New York. The views expressed herein are solely his own and are not at-
tributable to the Commission.
1 See, e.g., Baroni, Class Actions as a Consumer Protection Device, 9 AM. Bus. L.J.
141 (1971); Leete, Right of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal Courts -
An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. PITr. L REV. 39 (1971); Note, Expanding
the Notion of State Court Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for
Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1002 (1971).
2 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (McKinney 1967). This section has been criti-
cized by the Coordinating Committee for Consumer Protection of the Greater New
York Metropolitan Area, consisting of 31 state, federal, and local consumer protection
agencies, which urged adoption of an approach similar to that of the federal mail fraud
statute. See Want it Easier to Convict in Cheat Cases, New York Sunday News, Sept.
26, 1971, at 88. The problems presented in applying a statute based on a larceny con-
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federal criminal fraud provisions are primary tools of public en-
forcement.
The most effective and most used weapon against criminal fraud
upon consumers is the federal mail fraud statute.3 This section
makes it a crime, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment and
a $1,000 fine, to use the mails to execute or attempt to execute "any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or prom-
ises .... 4
The federal mail fraud statute contains a number of prosecu-
torial advantages. It is not necessary under this section that the
defendant have mailed anything personally. It is enough if the
action taken would normally have led to a mailing, and one in fact
occurred.5 Nor is it necessary that the mailing contain false or de-
ceptive material. It is sufficient if the mailing serves to further a
fraudulent scheme in a significant respect, as through collection of
bills on sales obtained through misrepresentation. 6
The statute has the crucial advantage of applying to any form
of deliberately practiced fraud, and to most fraudulent schemes of
any consequence, since it is usually impossible for such schemes to
avoid using the mails. Actual loss is not an element, so that success
of the scheme need not be shown;7 nor is the amount obtained at
issue, there being no need to establish that the perpetrator of the
cept in the consumer fraud context are discussed in text accompanying notes 22-24
infra.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). Examples of recent cases which have applied and
construed this section include: United States v. Armantrout, 411 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1969); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967); Nickles v. United
States, 381 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Williams v. United States, 368 F.2d
972 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 997 (1967); Fabian v. United States, 358
F.2d 187 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 821 (1966); Friedman v. United States,
347 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1965); Adams v. United States,
347 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 975 (1966); United States v.
Zovluck, 274 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd from the bench, No. 32652 (2d Cir.
Apr. 7, 1969).
4 The latter language was added by a 1909 amendment to insure coverage of fraud
involving a misrepresentation of intent regarding future conduct (false promises). Act
of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
5 See United States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 957 (1970); Adams v. United States, 312 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Weisman, 83 F.2d 470, 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 560 (1936).
6See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954).
7See Adimi v. United States, 346 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 823
(1965).
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fraud gained personally by the act.8 Further, the statute focuses on
the conduct and intent of the defendant rather than on the present
status of particular victims; hence prosecution cannot be defeated
by a recompensation of victims.
The federal mail fraud statute, however, also contains several
defects which limit its effectiveness. There is no provision for in-
junctions prohibiting violation of section 1341 either prior to trial
or as part of a judgment.9 This absence of adequate remedy con-
trasts with the authority for preliminary and final injunctive relief
under other federal statutes which also provide criminal penalties,
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act10 and the laws against securi-
ties fraud."
Lack of ability to obtain injunctive relief may have had a signifi-
cant negative impact in a recent mail fraud case. 2 Evidence in that
case indicated that approximately 30,000 people each year were sub-
jected to a fraudulent scheme in which many received telephone calls
offering "free" health services at defendants' clinic. After an initial
examination, some patients were shown x-rays by clinic staff mem-
bers and told that they needed a series of 80 treatments costing six
dollars each. Those who contracted for services but failed to pay
often received dunning notices that the "U.S. Credit Rating and
Reporting Agency" would notify their landlords and employers and
that a judge would declare them "GUILTY." Testimony at the
trial indicated that the operation continued and even expanded after
the indictment was obtained. Though cognizant of evidence indi-
cating that fraud was being perpetrated pendente lite, the trial court
nevertheless held that injunctions could not be issued in criminal
8 See Butler v. United States, 53 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1931); Calnay v. United
States, 1 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1924).
9 The absence of an express statutory provision for injunctive relief is particularly
critical because of a judicial reluctance, erroneous or otherwise, to use general equity
powers to enjoin criminal acts. Although the Supreme Court in In re Debs, 158 U.S.
584 (1895), sanctioned the use of injunctions against alleged criminal acts where the
general welfare of the citizenry had been threatened, equity courts have rarely enjoined
criminal acts. See Annot., 91 A.L.R. 315 (1934), and Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1145 (1926).
1029 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
1115 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970). The Committee on Federal Legislation of the
New York County Lawyers Association has unanimously recommended that injunctions
be considered as a possible remedy for violations of federal criminal laws generally.
See COMM. ON FED. LEGISLATION OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS ASS'N, RE-
PORT ON THE PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, 18, 28 (August 17, 1971);
Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
III(B), at 1406 (1972).
12 United States v. Zovluck, 274 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd from the
bench, No. 32652 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 1969).
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cases, and that no action could be taken by way of revocation of
bail or otherwise until the case bad been tried.'3 Furthermore, after
conviction, the principal defendant was released on bail pending
appeal based on assurances that he would terminate the business, but
evidence in connection with a post-conviction motion indicated that
he bad continued in business while on bail pending appeal. 4
An additional problem impairing effective public enforcement
stems from the fact that federal criminal statutes at present provide
little authority for the judge to order restitution as part of a sen-
tence. 15 Hence, victims who are unable to finance a civil suit to
recapture lost property often go without relief.' Although defen-
dants in criminal cases do occasionally offer to make restitution to
their victims, this generally occurs only in exchange for considera-
tion of a more lenient sentence.' 7  Thus, in cases where the court
is unwilling to impose a more lenient sentence, there is no way to
obtain restitution. For example, in the previously mentioned con-
sumer fraud case, a more lenient sentence was sought in return for
making restitution to the victims. The Government successfully
resisted such a compromise, arguing that an adequate sentence was
more important. Adequate sentencing and restitution, however, are
not in theory mutually exclusive, and, where both are justified, the
courts should not have to choose between the two.
Several changes in criminal laws applicable to consumer fraud
are suggested in the proposed Federal Criminal Code prepared by
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.' 8
'3 See Brief for the United States at 7-8, Zovluck v. United States, 448 F.2d 339
(2d Cir. 1971).
'
4 Zovluck v. United States, 448 F.2d 339, 342 (2d Cir. 1971).
15 Under federal probation statutes a defendant may, however, be required to make
restitution to the victim as a prerequisite to probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1958).
16 Federal courts and most states recognize that the owner of property or money
which has been the subject of a crime may bring a civil action to recover his loss. See,
e.g., Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins., 182 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. Kan.
1960).
17 Sometimes the idea of restitution as a factor justifying a more lenient sentence
ii suggested by the defendant through the probation officer. In other cases it may be
brought up by the defendant or his attorney in open court at the time of sentencing.
It may also be raised after sentence by way of a motion to reduce. In rare cases,
the judge will ask the defendant or defense attorney whether the defendant intends to
make restitution, with the obvious implication that this might have an effect on sen-
tence. Such bargaining is, of course, helpful to individual victims, but detrimental to
the interest of the public in deterring and preventing conduct injurious to the public.
See Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. III(B), at 1555 (1972).
18 The proposed Code has been under study since 1971. See generally, Hearings on
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It would replace the mail fraud statute with a federal theft statute,
defining schemes to defraud as one type of theft.'9
Critics have argued that the Code would eliminate the simplicity
of the long judicially construed and succinct language of the mail
fraud statute prohibiting any "scheme or artifice to defraud," and
that Code sections 1732 and 1741(a) would replace it with a long
and complicated definition of fraud as one form of larceny. The
latter would specifically exempt "puffing" which would not deceive
"ordinary" persons in the group addressed. This exemption might
make it more difficult to prosecute schemes specifically designed to
deceive the unsophisticated.
A possible alternative to the Code provision is a proposal for
legislation which would retain the full thrust of the present mail
fraud statute, but which would expand remedies available to the
court to include injunctive relief as part of a sentence in appropriate
cases, as well as the right to require restitution to victims. 2°
In spite of these shortcomings, the proposed Code contains
several other changes which could represent important improve-
ments in the federal mail fraud statute. Whereas the fine under
the mail statute is presently limited to $1,000, the National Com-
mission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has recommended
that fines be permitted up to twice the amount gained by a de-
fendant or lost by a victim in connection with a crime. The pro-
posed Code also expands the jurisdiction of the mail fraud statute
to cover use of any instrumentality of interstate commerce, includ-
ing the mails. This would alter the present situation where even
extensive use of intrastate telephones, which are part of an inter-
state network, may not be covered. Some fraudulent operators have
been known to go to great lengths to avoid use of the mails in order
not to be subjected to a statute proscribing schemes to defraud, pre-
ferring to be limited only by local larceny laws. Extension of juris-
diction, granting of injunctive powers, and authority to require resti-
tution, as well as the institution of a higher maximum fine level
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III(B)
(1972).
19 1d; Special Comm. on Consumer Affairs, The Proposed New Federal Criminal
Code and Consumer Protection, 27 REcORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEw YORK 324 (May 1972).
20 Cf. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2-8D5 (1973). See also COMM. ON FED.
LEGISLATION OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS ASS'N, REPORT ON THE PRO-
POSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, 18, 29 (Aug. 17, 1971); Hearings on Reform
of the Federal Criminal Laws, supra note 18.
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would go far toward strengthening effectiveness of federal criminal
laws against consumer fraud.
In addition to possible changes contained in the proposed
Federal Criminal Code, revisions of state statutes could do much to
enhance the effectiveness of state consumer protection. For in-
stance, state adoption of anti-fraud provisions comparable to mail
fraud, rather than statutes based on larceny concepts,2 ' would
strengthen the ability to control fraud.
The drawbacks stemming from larceny prosecutions are mani-
fold. First, the focus in a larceny prosecution is on loss to an indi-
vidual. Hence the victims must be named, and, if they can be given
refunds, threatened with harsh collection action, or otherwise in-
duced not to testify for the prosecution, the case may be lost.
Second, for the same reason, the scheme must be proved suc-
cessful for the prosecution to prevail. The amount of money lost by
each individual rather than the fraudulent intent of the defendant be-
comes the focus of the trial. To establish significant.amounts, many
more witnesses must be located and called, and both the investigation
and trial become far more complex and time-consuming. In certain
circumstances the prosecution may fail only because the effect of
false representations on the monetary value of an item is difficult
to prove.
Third, the focus of the entire proceeding and of the jury is on
the question of "theft," which has an entirely different psychologi-
cal effect than a focus on the true crime involved - a deliberate
"scheme to defraud." When the crime is classified as theft, it is
implicitly downgraded in importance in the mind of the prosecutor
as well as the jury and the sentencing judge. As a theft, it must
compete with other thefts being tried, and will presumably be
ranked in importance on the basis of that magic talisman - the
monetary amount involved in the crime against each individual.
The aggregate monetary impact on the public of a large-scale
scheme, which cannot be shown without calling large numbers of
otherwise unnecessary witnesses, is likely to be ignored.
Fourth, in the event of conviction, the theft concept tends to
direct attention to "paying back the money," by making restitution
to particular victims rather than deterring practices inimical to the
public and to legitimate business.22 And finally, some state larceny
21 See note 2 supra.
22 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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laws contain special requirements imposing a higher degree of proof
than is necessary for other crimes. 3
Thus, for a number of reasons, including improvements in pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules, adoption of the federal approach un-
der state law would enhance the effectiveness of state fraud prosecu-
tion.
B. Civil Enforcement
Public enforcement of civil anti-fraud provisions is presently
beset with procedural difficulties at both the state and federal levels.
First, the failure of many states to provide adequate sanctions for
violations of court orders has seriously undermined the effectiveness
of injunctive relief. For example, under the New York Judiciary
Law, fines for contempt of state court orders entered as a result of
injunctive proceedings against consumer fraud are limited to $250
for each violation.' Because this fine proved inadequate to deter
violations of state court injunctions, the Taylor Law, establishing a
new approach in the field of public employee labor disputes, pro-
vided larger penalties for contempt of court violations by striking
public employees.m By contrast, under federal law there is no limit
on the amount of fines which can be levied for contempt. 6 There
are presently, however, no general federal statutes which specifically
authorize injunctive proceedings against consumer fraud.
Not only are the sanctions for violations of injunctive enforce-
ment orders inadequate, but substantial procedural obstacles to the
effective federal enforcement of civil anti-fraud provisions also ex-
ist. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), the primary
source of federal civil consumer protection, authorizes the Commis-
sion to obtain cease and desist orders against unfair or deceptive
23 This higher standard sometimes derives from a belief that evidence of intent to
defraud must always be circumstantial, and that convictions resting on circumstantial
evidence must be held to a higher burden of proof. Such a requirement, however, is
not mandated by policy or precedent. Frequently, admissions of a fraudulent seller to
his employees or others are admissible as direct evidence. Further, the Supreme Court
has held that in Federal cases there is no distinction between the burden of proof in
cases depending on circumstantial evidence and in cases involving so-called "direct'
evidence. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954); United States
v. Woodner, 317 F. 2d 649, 651 (2d Cir. 1963).
24 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAWS § 753 (McKinney 1968).
25N.Y. Cr. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
26 Thus, in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), affg
and modifying 70 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1946), a $700,000 fine was levied against the
UMW on grounds of refusing to end a walkout in contempt of a federal court order.
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acts or practices in commerce. Procedures required by the Act,
however, have often created delays in enforcement. The Com-
mission's orders, for instance, become effective only after all ap-
peals from the order have been completed, including review by
the court of appeals and the denial of a petition for certioriari to
the United States Supreme Court.28  Moreover, even if a petition
for review of the order is not filed, the order will not be final until
the expiration of the 60 day period allotted for appeal. Thus,
because an appeal will further protract the date of compliance, the
alleged violator is encouraged to use appellate procedures as a de-
laying tactic.30 As an additional procedural shortcoming, the FTCA
encourages forum-shopping: a party found to be in violation of the
law can appeal to any judicial circuit in which the appellant does
business, resides, or allegedly committed the violation. These pro-
cedural advantages to respondents in FTC cases contrast sharply
with private suits where injunctions are effective immediately, un-
less a stay is obtained,31 and where the losing party cannot select
the appellate forum.
Even after a Commission order is final, rapid enforcement is not
always possible. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC
cease and desist orders, unlike injunctions, are not punishable by
contempt, even when they become final. Rather, a separate civil
penalty action must be instituted. This action results in monetary
penalties, in an amount no greater than $5000 for each violation,
unless a separate injunction based on violations of the Commission's
order is obtained.32 This procedure can be quite time-consuming.
In defense of retaining the present approach rather than allow-
ing injunctions, it can be argued that giving Commission orders the
effect of an injunction would make it more difficult to obtain con-
27 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
28 Id. § 45 (g).
29 ld.
30 The length of some delays has become notorious. See, e.g., Holland Furnace
Co., in which the complaint was issued by the Federal Trade Commission in 1954.
55 F.T.C. 91 (1958), appeal on jurisdictional issues denied sub no=. Holland Furnace
Co. v. F.T.C., 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960),
appeal on merits denied, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961). Criminal contempt proceed-
ings finally resulted in conviction of the corporation and three officers some 11 years
later. In re Holland Furnace Company, 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied
as to company, 381 U.S. 924 (1965), cert. granted as to respondent Cheff sub 'om.
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 382 U.S. 917 (1965), afl'd, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
3 1 FED. R. Civ. P. 62, 65: W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1373-74 (Wright ed. 1958); G_ KEETON & L. SHERIDAN, EQUITY
457-58 (1969).
32 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (1970).
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sent orders in appropriate cases. This problem could be obviated,
however, by providing that the Commission may waive the effect of
the order as an injunction where it determines that it is in the public
interest, and limit the effect of the order to authorizing civil penal-
ties.
Attempts by local jurisdictions to fill gaps in consumer legisla-
tion often create further problems. On the one hand, members of
the business community complain in many instances of the incon-
sistencies among many overlapping state and local regulations. On
the other hand, state and local spokesmen sometimes oppose na-
tional regulation if federal preemption of state and local initiative
may result, a consequence which would run directly counter to the
national thrust of encouraging greater responsibility at the state and
local levels of government. These conflicts might be overcome
through an integration of state, local, and federal enforcement by
empowering state and local authorities to enforce uniform federal
laws.
C. Local Enforcement of Federal Consumer Laws
Experience with consumer deception and fraud, especially in
retail sales in the inner city, indicates that effective enforcement will
in many cases require action by local authorities, in addition to pos-
sible further federal action. To that end, a federal right to enforce
in state courts the Federal Trade Commission Act and any regula-
tions" thereunder could be considered.
In considering the possibility of using state courts to enforce
federal legislation, it will be helpful to first review the development
of judicial doctrines regarding state enforcement of federal law. An
historical review will bring into clearer focus the relatively broad
mandate which the Supreme Court has given for enforcement of a
federal right in state courts.
The Supreme Court in Clafin v. Houseman,4 very early rejected
the possible argument that the Constitution, in providing for the
establishment of inferior federal courts, was meant to vest exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving federal claims in those courts. In
as Cf. S. 1599, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Section 6(b) of that bill provided
for suit by the United States Attorney General, any United States Attorney, or any
prosecuting attorney of any state or its political subdivisions against a seller who
violated the Act. Remedies included a maximum fine of $1500 in addition to recovery
of the purchase price by the injured buyer. See generally, Hearings on S. 1599 Before
the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
3493 U.S. 130 (1876).
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that case the Court announced in strong language that the state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts, and that a
citizen may bring an action in a state court even if that action is
based entirely on a federal claim.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court extended and further de-
fined the scope of concurrent jurisdiction. In the Second Employers'
Liability Cases,35 for example, the Court declared that where Con-
gress provided for enforcement of a federal claim in any court of
otherwise competent jurisdiction, the state courts had a clear con-
stitutional and statutory duty to hear such cases. In subsequent
cases the Court maintained and strengthened its position that fed-
eral rights cannot be barred or discriminated against in state
courts. 36
Thus it has long been dear that in "remedial" civil actions aris-
ing from federal claims, where a state court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the general subject matter, the state court is constitu-
tionally required to hear the case in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Until Testa v. Katt," however, it was often thought that state courts
were under no duty to enforce federal "penal" statutes.38
In Testa the Court rejected the "remedial/penal" distinction.
Under the Emergency Price Control Act of World War II,"' a buyer
of products sold at a price above the established ceiling could sue
to recover treble or minimum damages in any court of competent
35233 U.S. 1 (1912). There the Court was asked to review lower court rulings
on the constitutionality of the Federal Employers Liability Act, which provided for a
cause of action for injuries or wrongful death of an employee as a result of the negligence
of an employer-railroad engaged in interstate commerce. The Act established a standard
of comparative negligence, provided that violation of a health or safety law which re-
suited in injury or death would be negligence, abolished the "fellow-servant" doctrine,
and provided, most importantly, that actions could be brought in any court of other-
wise competent jurisdiction. The state courts from which appeals were heard had de-
clined to hear cases under these conditions, and granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant carriers on the ground that these cases were intended to be heard in federal
courts and that consequently state courts were free to decline jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court rejected these contentions, holding that state courts had both a constitutional and
statutory duty to hear such cases.
3 6 See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934), where the
Court held that a plaintiff seeking redress under the FELA for injuries sustained in
Tennessee could not be barred from Alabama courts merely because he sought to enforce
a federal right. But cf. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950);
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Ry., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
37330 U.S. 386 (1947).
3 8 See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545
(1925).
3 9 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, tit. II, § 205, 56 Stat. 33.
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jurisdiction.4" There was also a provision for intervention by the
Price Administrator in private suits for the purpose of assuring ef-
fective national enforcement of the law. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that the action brought under the statute was
penal rather than remedial, and that one sovereign state was thus
under no duty to enforce the penal laws of another."' In reversing,
the Supreme Court stated broadly:
For the purpose of this case, we assume, without deciding, that §
205(e) is a penal statute in the "public international," "private
international," or any other sense. . . . [I]t makes no difference
into which of these categories the Rhode Island court chose to
place the statute which Congress has passed. For we cannot ac-
cept the basic premise on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that it has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of
the United States than it has to enforce a penal law of another
state or a foreign country. Such a broad assumption flies in the
face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a nation.
It disregards the purpose and effect of Article VI of the Constitu-
tion .... 42
The sole qualification of the rule set forth by the Testa Court
is that the state courts are only required to exercise whatever juris-
diction they would have over cases of the same general type under
state law.43
One problem remaining was to what extent state courts, in hear-
ing federal claims, are bound by the same procedural rules as federal
courts. Under the FELA, Congress specifically guided the state
courts by writing provisions concerning comparative negligence and
the abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine.44 Yet, in other cases,
the Supreme Court has been called upon to rule whether a particu-
lar wrinkle in the state judicial fabric would deny the remedy which
Congress sought to create and protect. The Court, in Minneapolis
& St. Louis Ry. v. Bombolis, 45 first announced a rule permitting a
state court to apply usual state procedure in enforcing federal
claims. In this early case the Court approved a less than unanimous
40 See Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal
Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARv. L. REV. 966, 967 (1947).
41 Testa v. Katt, 71 R.I. 472, 47 A.2d 312 (1946).
42 330 U.S. at 389.
43An interesting question which the Supreme Court has not yet considered is
whether Congress can require state courts to hear federal claims where there is no
analogous state-created right enforceable in the state courts. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45, at 173 (2d ed. 1970).
44Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 53, 51 (1970).
45241 U.S. 211 (1916).
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verdict where authorized by state law, despite the fact that this pro-
cedure was foreign to the federal courts.
The "substance-procedure" distinction, however, gradually nar-
rowed,4" and Bombolis no longer appears to live beyond its facts.
In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R.,47 for instance, the
Court reviewed the judgment of an Ohio court in an FELA case.
That court had permitted the trial judge to enter judgment notwith-
standing the verdict because Ohio law governed as to issues of fraud
and such law provided that the judge, not the jury, should deter-
mine if fraud existed. The Supreme Court, in reversing, held that
federal law applied as to fraud, and that, in any event, fraud was
an issue to be determined by the jury in FELA cases. The Court
further held that trial by jury of all issues was an essential part of
the federal scheme. Thus it now seems clear that Congress clearly
has constitutional power to control the incidents of a state trial of
federal claims.48
Therefore, a federal law could be enacted which would provide
for uniform enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act or
other federal consumer protection laws in the state courts. Such a
statute could be limited to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, ex-
clude unfair methods of competition, and thereby avoid conflict or
overlap with the antitrust laws. The Federal Trade Commission
Act could be further amended to add a new section permitting the
attorneys general of the states, other state and local officials, and
Commission counsel to petition or apply for injunctions against vio-
lations of the Federal Trade Commission Act in state courts of com-
petent jurisdiction. Such an amendment could create a new right of
action, and be substantive as well as procedural.
Federal law and the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission
could be made the rules of decision for these state court cases. Fed-
eral law would then be followed as under section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act,49 and state court decisions could be reviewed by
certiorari. Without a rule of decision provision, the state courts
might disregard Commission decisions and thus frustrate the policy
46 See, e.g., Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949), where the
state procedure of construing a pleading strictly against the pleader was not permitted
to defeat a federal right. For a discussion of the case-by-case diminution of the
"substance-procedure" distinction in these reverse Erie cases, see cases cited in C.
WRIGHT, supra note 43, § 45 at 174.
47342 U.S. 359 (1952).
4 8 See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 43, § 45.
49 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
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of federal-state coordination. By providing that state courts treat
FTC decisions as rules of decision, the proposed provision would
encourage uniform enforcement. Furthermore, state limitations on
contempt penalties50 would not apply if federal law were expressly
both substantive and procedural in nature.
Federal legislation would go far toward improving the coverage
and effectiveness of consumer protection, first by providing for more
effective sanctions and second, by granting in explicit terms concur-
rent power to state and local governments to enforce federal laws,
rules, and regulations. Additional federal provisions in that event
would not tend to displace local enforcement, which will become
more, rather than less, essential.
II. CONSUMER DEFENSE IN PRIVATE SUITS
A. The Existing Procedures
Most litigation involving allegedly abused consumers arises in
the form of collection suits against those who do not pay for mer-
chandise or services. Many default because they can no longer
afford payments, and some, of course, do not pay because they wish
to defraud the seller. However, about a third of those sued in col-
lection cases claim to have been cheated in some way in the trans-
action.
An investigation of suits against consumers in the Civil Court
of the City of New York5 has indicated that a significant portion
of these suits are brought by a very small number of plaintiffs, many
of whom sue a very large proportion of their customers. For ex-
ample, one firm sued approximately one-third of its customers.
Most of these suits were brought by inner-city credit furniture,
jewelry, and appliance dealers; most of the remaining plaintiff-
retailers brought only one or two of the suits covered in the study
and sued only a very small percentage of their customers. Almost
all resulted in default judgments.5 2 Similar findings have been doc-
umented by David Caplovitz in a study covering several cities. 3
The consumer-defendant is usually without legal representation
50 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
51 This investigation was conducted under the aegis of the New York Regional
Consumer Protection Council which consists of 31 state, local, and federal enforcement
agencies.
52 The results of the preliminary survey were summarized in Hearings on Debt
Collection Before the New York Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission,
Sept. 1971.
5 3 See D. CAPLOvITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1971).
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in collection suits. Because the consumer's claim is frequently too
small to provide an attractive contingency fee and because many
victimized consumers are poor, few are able to retain attorneys to
handle their claims.54 Yet, legal services staffs frequently lack suf-
ficient personnel to represent all clients within the minimum pre-
scribed income limits, and those limits exclude many who cannot
actually afford counsel for consumer cases. Thus, in many in-
stances the consumer defendant is forced to proceed pro se.
A variety of factors militates against the effective assertion of this
manner of defense. Hearings conducted by the New York Region-
al Office of the Federal Trade Commission55 have indicated that an
overwhelming majority of the consumers who are sued do not have
a realistic opportunity to obtain a day in court. To begin with, many
defendant-consumers never receive notice of the suits against them,
including some who are deliberately neglected by process servers
who later file false statements that summonses were served (a prac-
tice known as "sewer service").n The consumer who does receive
a summons frequently does not understand it. Such lack of com-
prehension is merely a threshold problem, however. To avoid a
default judgment, the consumer must initially appear in court to
file an answer and must then return for the trial itself or any ad-
journment. Suits are often brought in distant locations, outside the
county where the consumer resides or where the transaction oc-
curred. Even when suit is brought in the county of residence or
of occurrence, the courthouse is often difficult to find in major
metropolitan areas and far from the location of the consumer's job
or home. Furthermore, since court sessions are almost always held
during the day,57 the defendant must take time off from work mere-
54 See Lefkowitz, The Non-Availability of Legal Services to Persons of Moderate
Income, 27 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 144
(March 1972).
55 Hearings on Debt Collection Before the New York Regional Office of the Federal
Trade Commission, Sept. 1971.
56See United States v. Wiseman, 445 F. 2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
967 (1971); United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Comm. on Legal
Assistance, Does a Vendee Under an Installment Sales Contract Receive Adequate
Notice of a Suit Instituted by the Vendor?, 23 RECORD OF THE Ass', OF THE BAR
OF THE CITy OF NEW YORK 263 (April 1968); Comm. on Grievances and Legal
Assistance, Improper Collection Practices, 23 RECORD OF THE ASSN OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 844, 849-50 (1971); Tuerkheimer, Service of Process in
New York City: A Proposed End to Unregulated Criminality, 72 COLuM. L. REV 847
(1972).
5 7 Small claims courts which do sit at night usually do not hear cases brought by
corporations.
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ly to say that a trial is desired - something that those who can
afford counsel do not have to do. Thus, for many consumers, de-
fending against a suit in court requires the loss of salary. Pre-
litigation pressure is sometimes also applied to prevent consumers
from contesting debts. Such intimidation may take the form of
pressure on consumers' employers, harassment devices such as the
use of tough-looking collectors, calls to children, neighbors and
others, frequent calls late at night, threats of arrest, and so on.5
Thus, despite the fact that the substantive law of most jurisdic-
tions gives consumers a variety of significant rights, numerous pro-
cedural impediments often effectively deny aggrieved consumers
their day in court.
B. Possible Changes
Apart from measures to overcome abuses in the collection proc-
ess, two basic steps could greatly improve the procedural posture of
consumers desiring to raise defenses of fraud or unconscionability.
First, legislation could confirm and clarify the authority of presid-
ing judges of civil courts to set aside default judgments where a
pattern of abuse can be shown. 9 Such authority was exercised in
the fall of 1971, when Administrative Judge Edward Thompson of
the Civil Court of the City of New York issued an order to show
cause why a large number of default judgments obtained by Vigi-
lant Protective Systems, Inc,. a burglar alarm firm, should not be
vacated and enforcement of outstanding judgments enjoined." The
theory behind Judge Thompson's action was that the Administrative
Judge of the Court had inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuses of
its processes.
In 1972, legislation was introduced in the New York State Leg-
islature6 to clarify and expressly confirm the authority of adminis-
trative judges to initiate protective orders setting aside default judg-
ments. The landmark legislation would for the first time expressly
recognize the power and duty of the courts to keep their own pro-
58 Hearings on Debt Collection Before the New York Regional Office of the Federal
Trade Commission, Sept. 1971.
59 The authority of judges to vacate judgments typically stems from a procedural
rule such as 60(b) of the Federal Rules which permits a court "[o)n motion and upon
such terms as are just," to vacate a judgment for any reason justifying relief. FED.
R. Civ. P. 60(b).
60 See In re Vigilant Protective Systems, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
61A. 10668 195th Sess. (1972) introduced by Assemblyman Field; S. 9322 in-
troduced by Senator Langley. The bill was passed by the New York State Senate.
No action, however, was taken by the Assembly.
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ceedings fair by intervening where a particular litigant obtains a
large number of default judgments by improper or illegal means,
or where a common defense, such as fraud or unconscionability,
would apply to a large number of default judgments. Under the
proposed New York legislation, the matter would be referred for
final decision to an appropriate judge other than the one initiating
the proceedings.
Judge Thompson's action and the proposed legislation seek to
eliminate the necessity of relying on the unlikely expectation that
each consumer who has been denied due process will come forward.
Enjoinder of judgment enforcement permits a remedy at the source
of one of the worst evils - abuses of the collection process which
deny the consumer his day in court. Such a remedy also acts against
violators of existing law without imposing new requirements on
legitimate business.
A second step toward the improvement of the consumer's pro-
cedural posture has been outlined by a New York Bar group. 2 In
an effort to attack the sources of the problems themselves, as dhtinct
from merely supplying individualized remedies, the group has pro-
posed the enactment of legislation which would (1) require, in ad-
dition to other methods of service of process required by state law,
the mailing of notice to the consumer that suit is being filed; (2) re-
quire that the summons contain a tear-off business reply card answer,
which the consumer may mail to the clerk of the court to request a
trial - in lieu of making a personal appearance at the clerk's office
for that purpose; (3) limit the location of suits against consumers to
the county where the consumer lives or where the transaction took
place; (4) have the court sit on specified nights to accommodate
those who work during the day; (5) allow friends of the consumer
to accompany him if he does not have counsel; (6) permit adjourn-
ments at the request of creditors and discovery proceedings only for
good cause; and (7) provide adequate advance notice of the date
of trial, perhaps, for example, by mail several days before trial.0
Further, more systematic and determined efforts should be made
by the Bar to meet its responsibility to provide counsel in these
cases. The collective responsibility of the Bar is particularly clear
where the legal system imposes itself on the party, the consumer
6 2 The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York County Lawyers Ass'n.
63 Proposals 1-3 were made by the Committee on Federal Legislation of the New
York County Lawyers Ass'n during hearings held by the New York Regional Office of the
Federal Trade Commission, and in a report on Senate Bill 1602, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess.
(1971). Proposals 4-7 were made by this group in the report on the Senate Bill only.
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being a defendant in a lawsuit. The consumer who is sued obvious-
ly has little more choice to participate in the legal proceedings than
does a defendant in a criminal case. Absence of the availability of
legal assistance under such circumstances may well amount to an
effective denial of due process.6
Fair representation of the disadvantaged consumer may require
consideration of innovative approaches. Foundation funding, for
example, might be obtained for lawyers who would represent indi-
gent consumers.
Other, more drastic measures have been proposed. For example,
it has been suggested that legal paraprofessionals, or lay advocates
be permitted to advise or represent consumers in such cases. This
proposal, however, has a number of readily apparent drawbacks,
including: potential mishandling of cases; possible advice based on
factors other than the best interests of the individual clients; lack
of responsibility to the court by one not an officer of court; and
erosion of the position of the Bar as the sole group that can prop-
erly conduct litigation. But if paraprofessionals are to be limited
to such nonlegal duties as communicating with a creditor on behalf
of the debtor's attorney, gathering facts, and so on, then the Bar
will have to take further steps to meet its responsibility to provide
the full range of legal services. Lawyers as a group cannot take
the position that legal representation is the sole responsibility of
the Bar and then default on that responsibility.
If there is unresponsiveness to the problems of indigent con-
sumers, other still more undesirable and Draconian possibilities may
eventually come about. It has been suggested by some that, regard-
less of the outcome of the trial, court costs be automatically levied
against the plaintiff-creditor in consumer collection cases. The pro-
ceeds of these costs would then be used to establish a fund to pro-
vide counsel for defendant-consumers who cannot afford represen-
tation. This proposal, however, has the serious drawback, perhaps
of constitutional dimension, of placing a tax on access to the courts,
but it lingers as a possibility if not enough else is done.
Such "solutions" as permitting lay advocates in court or placing
what would amount to a tax on access to the courts in certain cases
might generate even more serious problems than those they purport
64 See Comm. on Civil Rights, The Right to a Day in Court and the Consumer
Defendant, 23 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 586
(Nov. 1968); Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE
L.J. 543 (1967); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
1322 (1966).
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to solve. But these or other drastic and possibly harmful medicines
are likely to be demanded unless less onerous remedies are made to"
work.
IlL CONCLUSION
Improving the procedural avenues for protection of consumers'
rights under existing substantive law would be in the interest of
both the consumer and the business community. This is so because
consumer fraud injures both business and the public. Indeed, legiti-
mate business suffers as severely as the public, for several reasons.
Consumer fraud creates a climate of hostility injurious to the good
reputation to which honest business is entitled. It also constitutes
unfair competition against an honest business which does not resort
to the fraudulent practices. Further, fraudulent practices create a
climate in which demands for far more restrictive regulation than
would otherwise be necessary are likely to be made.
During the time that a competitor is able to engage in practices
found to be illegal because remedies are slow or ineffective, the
other firms in the industry must either follow the same practices,
with the likelihood of being challenged and subjected to potential
liability of one kind or another, or not engage in the practices and
be placed at a competitive disadvantage with those who continue
the practices.
As much attention should be devoted to strengthening the pro-
cedural tools for enforcing the law against consumer fraud as is paid
to the formulation of rules governing conduct. Otherwise, we fail
to deliver what is promised, with detrimental consequences to the
public, to legitimate business which wants to comply with the law
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